The rapidly emerging field of synthetic biology has tremendous potential to address some of the most compelling challenges facing our planet, by providing clean renewable energy, nutritionally-enhanced and environmentally friendly agricultural products, and revolutionary new life-saving cures. However, leaders in the synthetic biology movement have voiced concern that biotechnology's current patent-centric approach to intellectual property is in many ways illsuited to meet the challenge of synthetic biology, threatening to impede follow-on innovation and open access technology.
I. Introduction
A team led by Craig Venter recently achieved a scientific milestone by "booting up" a viable bacterium using a synthetic bacterial genome composed entirely of DNA synthesized in the laboratory. 1 Their success has drawn heightened public attention to "synthetic biology," the leading edge of the biotechnology revolution. For example, President Obama responded to the announcement by directing his bioethics commission to conduct a 6-month study on the potential benefits and risks of synthetic biology, and asked the panel to recommend "any actions the Federal government should take to ensure that America reaps the benefits of this developing field of science while identifying appropriate ethical boundaries and minimizing identified risks." 2 Congress likewise wasted no time in responding to Dr. Venter's announcement, promptly convening a hearing to explore the potential and risks of synthetic biology. 3 Leading synthetic biologists provided compelling examples of the potential fruits of synthetic biology, including producing clean water, new biofuels 4 and drugs for diseases that afflict people in the developing world. 5 One of the scientists that testified at the hearing, Drew Endy of Stanford, identified an important role for intellectual property in the development of synthetic biology, but noted that for a variety of reasons patents might be ill-suited for the task. 6 He proposed that the advance of synthetic biology might be better served by the development of alternative forms of intellectual property protection. 7 Historically, patents have served as the primary form of intellectual property protection for biotechnology, but as we stand poised to move into a new era of synthetic biology it is worth considering Professor Endy's suggestion that other forms of intellectual property protection might be more suited to the task. As noted by Dr. Endy, patents are expensive and often take 1 Elizabeth Pennisi, Genomics: Synthetic Genome Brings New Life to Bacterium, 328 SCI. 958 (2010). many years to issue, which is a problem because synthetic biology is characterized by rapid and profuse incremental innovations. 8 Patents also have the potential to unduly impede follow-on research, a characteristic that has been the subject of much debate and concern in recent years, particularly with respect to patents directed towards genetic discoveries and life science research. 9 The recent lawsuit brought by the ACLU challenging the validity and constitutionality of gene patents was motivated largely by a widely held perception that gene patents are hindering biomedical innovation, 10 as have been proposals to limit the patentability of genetic inventions, and research tools in general.
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In short, there are many who believe that the current IP regime is suboptimal for promoting innovation in biotechnology, and the concern will continue to mount as synthetic biology advances. But perhaps history can help chart a better course. More than 30 years ago, a similar situation existed with respect to the then nascent software industry, with respect to which there was a similar concern that the IP status quo was inadequate to provide appropriate incentives for innovation and dissemination of technology. 12 At that time, it was an open question as to whether patent protection was available, or even appropriate, for computer programs, and copyright was enlisted to provide intellectual property protection for software.
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For many years copyright functioned as the primary mode of intellectual property protection for software. Eventually, the scope of subject matter recognized as eligible for patent protection expanded to encompass software, but to this day copyright continues to play an important, and in many ways complementary, role in the protection of software. This article explores the feasibility of extending copyright protection further so as to encompass engineered 8 Id.
9 COMM. ON 12 See infra Section III. 13 Id.
synthetic genetic sequences, and concludes that the extension is probably justified, based in large part upon the analogy between software and engineered DNA.
My proposal to consider extending copyright protection to engineered genetic sequences is far from novel; in fact, it was persuasively made nearly 30 years ago, in the early days of biotechnology. 14 However, to date the proposal has not been seriously considered by Congress, the courts or the US Copyright Office, and most commentators who have addressed the issue in recent years have rejected it. 15 But in my view recent advances in synthetic biology have changed the equation, and as noted by Dr. Endy, it is important that we think outside of the box when considering the optimal intellectual property regime for advancing synthetic biology.
In this article, I describe the growing technological convergence of software and synthetic biology, and the close analogy between software and engineered genetic sequences which to my mind justifies extension of copyright detection to engineered DNA. In a nutshell, my position is that the major doctrinal leap occurred 30 years ago when copyright protection was recognized for computer programs. In view of the close analogy between software and engineered DNA, the further extension to encompass engineered genetic sequences is a relatively modest incremental expansion. For the most part, the same considerations which led to the extension of copyright the software apply to engineered DNA.
II. Previous Proposals for Extending Copyright Protection to Engineered Genetic Sequences Have Been Largely Dismissed
In 1982, in the early days of recombinant DNA technology, Prof. Irving Kayton published a prescient article explaining why recombinant genetic sequences are copyrightable subject matter under US law. 16 In his article he identifies a number of policy objectives that would be promoted by extending copyright protection to genetic information, and observes that "under certain circumstances, from a practical as well as legal viewpoint, copyright protection may be the only or the most effective way an 'author' can protect a valuable genetic 'work.'" 17 Professor Kayton's article was published shortly after Congress amended the Copyright Statute to explicitly acknowledge copyright protection for computer programs. 18 At the time, computer programming and genetic engineering were both generally recognized as nascent technologies poised to play an increasingly significant role in the nation's technological future.
He recognized the analogy between the two technologies, and explained that a further expansion of copyrightable subject matter to include engineered genetic sequences would be generally consistent with copyright's recent embrace of computer programs.
Professor Kayton's suggestion that copyright be extended to engineered DNA sequence has been seconded in a few subsequent articles. For example, a student comment set forth a similar proposal in 1987. 19 In 1988, shortly before becoming a law professor, Dan Burk published an article essentially agreeing with Kayton that the logic behind extending copyright protection to software would also justify copyright protection for engineered genetic sequences, but ultimately concluding that public policy considerations weighed against providing copyright protection for DNA. 20 In his view, the scope of copyrightable subject matter should be informed by public policy considerations, and for that reason he advised against extending copyright to DNA.
In 2002, Willem "Pim" Stemmer, the scientist who invented "DNA shuffling," 21 wrote a short article in which he assumed that copyright protection was not available for DNA sequences per se. 22 However, as a pioneering scientist actively engaged in the engineering and 20 Dan Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 Jurimetrics J. 469 (1988) (expressing view that the logic behind extending copyright protection to computer programs could also be used to justify copyright of recombinant DNA sequences, but that policy considerations appeared to counsel against copyright for DNA ).
21 "DNA Shuffling … is a way to rapidly propagate beneficial mutations in a directed evolution experiment. It is used to rapidly increase DNA library size," available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dna_shuffling. 22 Willem P.C. Stemmer, How to Publish DNA Sequences with Copyright Protection, 20 Nature Biotechnology 217 (2002). "DNA shuffling" is a powerful tool for engineering synthetic genes and proteins, and was the basis for the foundation of the biotechnology company Maxygen, for whom the author was previously employed.
commercialization of synthetic DNA sequences, Stemmer believed that some form of copyright protection would be beneficial. To circumvent what he perceived to be a prohibition against direct copyright protection for engineered DNA, he outlined a proposal whereby a DNA sequence is converted into music, and then copyrighted as a musical work. 23 Although this
proposal by a non-lawyer scientist is probably unworkable, it clearly shows that Drew Endy is not the only pioneering synthetic biologists to seriously consider the potential value of copyright protection for engineered DNA sequences.
Overall, however, the consensus appears to have come down heavily against the copyrightability of engineered genetic sequences. 24 The US Copyright Office does not appear to have ever officially addressed the question, but has unofficially taken the position that DNA, whether naturally occurring or synthetic, is not copyrightable subject matter, and will not grant copyright registration to gene sequences or DNA molecules. 25 There The notion that copyright could extend to genetic sequences does seem counterintuitive, and it is not surprising the initial response of most people has been to reject the notion.
Historically, copyright has been the realm of expressive works of art and literature, while patents have been the primary form of intellectual property protection available to technological innovation. The propriety of even patent protection for DNA sequences has been challenged, in part due to the widely held belief that DNA and genes are the blueprint of life, and as such unsuited to individual property rights. 28 This antipathy is reflected in current attempts to limit or even bar the patenting of genetic material and information. 29 The resistance against property rights in DNA is visceral, due in large part I believe to the deeply personal, some would say spiritual, link between DNA and the essence of what it means to be human, and between an individual and his or her own unique DNA.
Professor Kayton reported that he too was initially "shocked and perplexed" when an attendee a continuing legal education program on copyrights first sparked his interest in the topic by asking him to explain exactly why it is that a genetically engineered organism could not be copyrighted. 30 However, after shaking off his initial skepticism, and his intuition that genetic sequences could not be eligible for copyright protection, he opened his mind and embarked upon a rigorous inquiry into the question.
In the midst of this scholarly exercise, Kayton confessed that "every intellectual and emotional prejudice, both sophisticated and primitive, to which [a man] is subject opposed coming to the conclusion [I] finally reached. Copyright for engineered DNA sequences seemed ludicrous." 31 Ultimately, however, he was forced to conclude that logic did in fact dictate that some engineered DNA sequences should be eligible for copyright protection, based to a large extent upon the analogy between engineered genetic sequences and computer programs. 32 He genetic material's going to be more important than the stuff itself and so you might transition away from patents to copyright") response, and will realize that the real doctrinal leap occurred 30 years ago when Congress and courts categorized computer programs as copyrightable "literary works." 35 In comparison, the extension of copyright doctrine from computer software to engineered genetic sequences is relatively modest, and flows logically and naturally once one has accepted the premise that a set of encoded instructions directed towards a non-human audience is copyrightable.
III. Historically, the Expansion of Copyright Law Has Been Driven by Advances in Technology
The extension of copyright to encompass engineered genetic sequences would be entirely consistent with the historical development of copyright law, which has been marked by a progressive expansion in the scope of protectable subject matter. The original US copyright statute, enacted in 1790, limited copyright protection to a short list of explicitly enumerated categories of subject matter: essentially, maps, charts and books. Over the next two centuries it expanded to encompass "designs, engravings, etchings" (1802), musical compositions (1831), 33 Id. at 213-214 ("in many circumstances it may be the single most vibrant and flexible form of protection for manmade genetic sequences."). As a general rule, copyright has tended to expand in response to new technologies that render the cost of reproducing a work much lower than the cost of initially creating the work, giving rise to an environment where free riders threaten to chill the incentive for creation. In order to maintain an adequate reward for creativity, the scope of copyrightable subject matter is allowed to expand in order to provide creators with a legal barrier to copying.
For example, the development of technologies that facilitated the production of multiple copies of a graphical work, first by etchings, and later lithography and photography, led to the embrace of these works by copyright law. The development of machine-readable media, initially in formats such as piano player rolls, later in analog media such as film and phonorecords, and ultimately in digital recordings, eventually resulted in an expansion of copyright law to encompass works fixed in these media.
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Another recurring theme is that the expansion of copyright often lags far behind the technological advance that prompted the expansion. Copyright law tends to react to new technologies, rather than addressing them proactively. We see this today, for example, in the difficulty copyright law is experiencing in adapting to the development of digital media and new forms of content distribution, but the problem is nothing new.
For example, in the not-too-distant past copyright protection was only afforded to works expressed in a medium that could be directly interpreted by a human. In White-Smith, decided in 1908, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether content fixed in a machinereadable format, specifically, music transcribed as an arrangement of holes on a player piano roll, fell within the ambit of copyright protection. 38 The Court, somewhat reluctantly, answered no, and held that a player piano roll is not a "copy" of the musical composition recorded thereon, consider and make recommendations with respect to the question of whether, and to what extent, computer programs could be protected under current copyright law, and whether copyright law should be amended to accommodate computer programs. CONTU issued its highly influential report in 1978, which concluded not only that copyright protection for computer programs was justified both in terms of legal doctrine and innovation policy, but that computer programs in fact already were copyrightable under both the 1976 and 1909 Copyright Acts. 50 Because computer programs were already copyrightable, no amendment to the statute was thought necessary to extend copyright to software, although some refinements to the statute were suggested to address some unique concerns associated with applying copyright law to software.
In its report, the commission stated that the underlying principle of copyright is that "if the cost of duplicating information is small, and it is simple for a less than scrupulous person to duplicate it[,] legal as well as physical protection for the information is a necessary incentive if such information is to be created and disseminated." 51 As an illustration, the commission pointed out that in the 19th century, when music was recorded on a brass wheel to be played on a music box, "the cost of making the wheel was inseparable from the cost of producing the final Analogously, with respect to software, the commission found that while there was little reason to protect the wired circuit or plug boards used to communicate instructions to early computers, the ease with which modern software can be copied weighed heavily in favor of providing effective intellectual property protection for computer programs in the form of copyright. 54 The commission further opined that not only was copyright protection desirable for computer programs, it was already available, based on the explicit declaration in the copyright 50 CONTU Report, supra note 36, at 16.
51 Id. at 10. 52 Id.
53 Sound Recording Act of 1971, supra note 42.
54 CONTU Report, supra note 36, at 10. As developed more fully below, the same reasoning would apply to DNA sequences, which like computer software are inherently susceptible to easy duplication, but can require a substantial investment to develop.
act that "literary works" are copyrightable, and the commission's characterization of software as a form of literary work.
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In 1980, Congress adopted the commission's recommendation and amended the Copyright Act to include a definition of "computer programs." 56 Although Congress has never enacted legislation explicitly stating that computer programs are copyrightable subject matter, the legislative history of the 1980 amendment defining computer programs in the copyright act clearly indicates that Congress viewed computer programs as a form of "literary work" falling within the scope of "original works of authorship," and courts have universally interpreted the amendment as signaling congressional approval for copyright protection of software. 57 Indeed,
by not explicitly adding computer programs to the enumerated list of copyrightable subject matter, Congress implicitly endorsed the commission's view that the statute already provided copyright protection for software.
Even though the 1980 amendment implicitly sanctioned copyright protection for software, there remained uncertainty as to the scope of this protection. For example, did copyright protection extend to object code, which could only be read by a computer, or was it limited to human readable source code? What about operating system software, whose only intended audience is a machine? Or a computer program embodied in computer readable media, such as a CD-ROM? Ultimately, all these questions are answered in the affirmative.
For example, some prominent members of the CONTU commission expressed the view that while copyright protection is appropriate for some computer programs, it should not be generally available to all computer programs. While Professor Nimmer joined with the majority in recommending copyright protection for some software, he filed a concurring opinion to the commission's report arguing that copyright protection should be limited to "computer programs which produce works which themselves qualify for copyright protection," i.e., word processors, graphics programs and the like. In contrast, he felt that more utilitarian software, such as computer programs "which control the heating and air-conditioning in a building, or which As has so often been the case, the extension of copyright protection to software lagged many years behind the initial development of the technology. Indeed, one can speculate that if patent protection had been available for computer programs from the beginning, there would have been far less compelling reason to extend copyright protection to software, and it seems quite possible that Congress and the courts would never have made a doctrinal leap to categorize software as a copyrightable literary work.
Contrast this with the situation in genetic engineering, where patents have been available and functioned reasonably well since the earliest days of the technology. With the availability of patent protection, there has been no compelling need for any alternative form of intellectual
property. This lack of urgency likely explains why the scope of copyrightable subject matter has yet to undergo the natural evolution from software to engineered genetic sequences predicted by Professor Kayton.
IV. The Analogy between Software and Synthetic Genetic Material Supports an Extension of Copyright to Engineered Genetic Sequences
When faced with the challenge of conforming copyright law to accommodate a new technology, Congress and the courts have relied heavily on analogy. The initial decision to extend copyright protection to software, for example, was based in large part upon the perceived analogy between software and traditional literary works. 59 Analogy has also been used extensively by courts faced with questions regarding the scope and extent of copyright protection 58 CONTU Report, supra note 36, at 27. 59 See CONTU Report at 16, supra note 36.
for software. 60 It is thus informative to explore the analogy between computer programs and engineered DNA.
A computer program is essentially a set of instructions, each directing a computer or other machine to perform some function. 61 The program is written by a human, and can be expressed in a format that is directed towards a human reader. For example, a computer program can be printed on a piece of paper in the form of source code, which is designed to be interpretable by a human. Alternatively, the same program can be expressed as object code, which is intended for communication with the machine itself, although in principle even object code could be directly interpreted by human conversant in that language.
However, the whole point of computer software is to communicate with a computer, so the computer program is compiled into a machine-readable format, and then transcribed upon a computer readable medium. Computers normally do not read print on a page, but they can read the same set of instructions if encoded in a tangible medium that can be deciphered by machine.
For example, a computer program can be transcribed upon a CD-ROM disk, in a process which entails physically altering the medium, by introducing microscopic indentations into the aluminum coating on the disc. 61 A "computer program" is defined in the Copyright Act as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 USC 101.
62 A "CD-ROM is a pre-pressed compact disc that contains data accessible to, but not writable by, a computer for data storage and music playback," available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CD-ROM.
Because of its modular nature, software can be represented at different levels of abstraction. At the lowest level of abstraction, software is described by the string of zeros and ones that ultimately provide direction to the computer, or at a slightly higher level of abstraction Like software, in order to be useful engineered genetic sequences must be transcribed into a format that can be interpreted by the primary intended audience, the difference being the audience in this case is a cell rather than a computer. In either case, this involves physically transcribing instructions into the appropriate medium of communication at a "nano" level. In the case of a CD-ROM, the reflective properties of a thin layer of aluminum are altered by making microscopic indentations, while in DNA the ordering of molecular subunits (individual nucleotides) conveys the message to the appropriate audience.
Importantly, as noted above, copyright protection extends to copyrightable subject matter embodied in a format that is not directly decipherable by a human being. For that reason, copying of a CD-ROM can constitute copyright infringement, even though the copied medium could not be directly read by human being. In the same manner, there would appear to be no obstacle to finding copyright infringement based on the copying of a DNA molecule representing a copyrightable set of instructions.
Not only was the use of analogy instrumental in justifying the initial extension of copyright to software, courts have often resorted to analogy when faced with a novel application of copyright law to software. For example, in assessing the range of copyright protection program to be an unprotectable "method of operation" based on an analogy it saw between the command hierarchy and the control buttons on a VCR. 68 Similarly, the analogy between computer programs and engineered genetic sequences not only argues in favor of extending copyright to engineered genetic sequences, but will prove invaluable in establishing the contours of copyright protection for engineered genetic sequence.
This will substantially facilitate adaptation of copyright law to accommodate the unique technical and policy issues which will arise if copyright is extended to DNA, since the courts have already grappled with, and to a large extent resolved, these issues with respect to computer programs.
The ability to conceptualize software at different levels of abstraction often plays an important role in determining the extent to which copyright can be enforced to protect various elements of a computer program from copying. 69 At the lowest level of abstraction, expressed as lines of code, it is well-established that copyright affords protection against unauthorized literal copying of a computer program. 70 But courts will also enforce copyright in cases that involve no literal copying of code, but where the infringer copies more abstract elements of a computer program, such as the structural arrangement of modules and functional elements. 71 This is often referred to as "non-literal copying," based on analogy to cases finding copyright infringement of more conventional literary works where the copying occurs at a more abstract level, such as plot or storyline. 72 However, in the case of both conventional literary works and computer programs, the courts will not provide copyright protection for software elements expressed at the highest levels of abstraction, characterizing these elements as the unprotectable "idea" of the work, as opposed to a protectable expression of that idea. 73 For that reason, subsequent innovators are free to copy higher order concepts from existing copyrighted computer programs of others, so long as they implement those concepts in an original matter. 72 Id. at 696 (Infringement of software at a higher level of abstraction is sometimes referred to as non-literal infringement, as opposed to copying of the code itself, which is referred to as literal infringement).
73 Id. at 703.
Like software, engineered DNA can be expressed at different levels of abstraction, and thus should be amenable to copyright protection even in the absence of literal copying at the level of nucleotide sequence. For example, copyright protection could be available to protect against the copying of an engineered arrangement of genetic modules, i.e., protein coding domains and regulatory elements, even in the absence of copying at the genetic sequence level.
However, analogous to the case with software, higher level concepts embodied in an engineered genetic sequence would be unprotectable and hence available to enrich the public domain. Case law pertaining to copyright infringement of software at various levels of abstraction will provide guidance for courts confronted with analogous facts relating to engineered DNA.
Another important characteristic shared by software and engineered genetic sequences is that for both the cost of development greatly exceeds the cost of duplication, owing to the fact that both can serve as the template for their own reproduction. 74 A computer program encoded in digital form can be easily and repeatedly copied, resulting in a virtually unlimited number of essentially perfect copies. In the same way, DNA serves as its own template for the reproduction of the exact copies by biological DNA replication processes, both in vitro and in vivo.
Significantly, because the copies reproduced are identical to the original, and therefore can function as another template for further copying, software and DNA are both susceptible to viral replication. Each time a computer program is copied it creates a new template for copying, and the iterative copying of copies can result in the production of copies at an exponential rate, mimicking the spread of a virus. In the same manner, a DNA sequence serves as the template for production of an exact copy, and each copy likewise can serve as a template for subsequent copies. Indeed, the terms "viral replication" and "computer virus," widely used in connection with digital files and computer software, arise out of the remarkable propensity of viral DNA to self replicate.
V. The Synthetic Biology Revolution
Earlier arguments for extending copyright to engineered DNA, as exemplified by Professor Kayton's article, were proposed at a time when the capabilities of genetic engineers 74 See supra Section III.
were still quite limited, and engineered genetic sequences tended to deviate only slightly from naturally occurring sequences. Subsequent advances have greatly expanded the molecular tool chests of genetic engineers, permitting the design and deployment of complex engineered genetic sequences bearing ever less resemblance to naturally occurring sequences. These advances, which are often referred to under the trendy moniker of "synthetic biology," 75 are bringing genetic engineering and software engineering into ever closer alignment, and are prompting legal academics like myself and Professor Torrance, along with synthetic biologists such as Stemmer and Endy, to raise the issue anew in light of these developments.
In the early days of biotechnology, genetic engineering primarily entailed recombining naturally occurring genetic sequences. 76 The objective was often simply to use recombinant technology to produce a microbial cell capable of producing large amounts of a naturally occurring human protein in culture. This would generally entail cloning the genetic sequence encoding the desired human protein, slightly modifying the sequence as necessary to conform with the requirements of the microbe, and then linking the gene sequence to the appropriate regulatory elements in the orientation necessary to direct expression of the protein in the microbial host.
This classic example of engineered DNA is characterized by minimal deviation from naturally occurring sequences, and deviations dictated by relatively strict and straightforward functional constraints. To use the language of copyright law, relatively minimal "expressive choice" is exercised in designing the deviations from the naturally occurring starting material.
The limited number of reasonable alternate designs available for some of the most straightforward genetic engineering projects could have some bearing on the copyrightability of the resulting genetic sequence. Under the merger doctrine, the expression of an idea can be uncopyrightable if there are only a limited number of alternate ways of effectively expressing that idea. 77 The policy behind the merger doctrine is that under such circumstances protection of 75 Synthetic biology has been defined as "the design and construction of new biological functions and systems not found in nature," available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic_biology. To encourage the creation of the foundational tools and methodologies that will be necessary to facilitate advances in synthetic biology, synthetic biologists have joined forces to create the BioBricks Foundation. The primary mission of the BioBricks Foundation is to promote the development and availability of "standard biological parts" for use in higher order genetic engineering, based on design principles taken from traditional engineering practice. 95 To the extent these efforts succeed, they will render the engineering of DNA much more analogous to conventional engineering, and particularly software engineering, than was the case in the early days of genetic engineering. 100 In genetic programming, functions are represented as "chromosomes," and the main operators used in the evolutionary algorithms are "crossover" and "mutation," concepts taken from genetics.
101
Meta-Genetic Programming is a proposed technique of evolving a genetic programming system using genetic programming itself. It is based upon the premise that software chromosomes, crossovers, and mutations should, like their real-life counterparts, be allowed to change on their own rather than being determined by human programmer. 102 As these trends continue, the justification for maintaining copyright protection for software while denying it for engineered DNA becomes increasingly questionable. protein. 109 The GAT gene described above varies dramatically from anything that exists in nature. The current success of the biotechnology industry is based in large part upon genetic modifications that are far from trivial, and the future of synthetic biology promises even more dramatic departure from naturally occurring genetic sequences.
VI. Some of the Arguments against Copyright Protection for Engineered DNA Are Based on an Incomplete Understanding of the State-Of-The-Art in Genetic Engineering
Another recent article, this one by Gargano, argues that DNA sequences are not copyrightable because they are "obtained from nature and are probably not original." 110 His arguments for the most part echo Michelotti's, and likewise fail to appreciate the significant differences between engineered genetic sequences and naturally occurring sequences, and the power of modern synthetic biology.
VII. Some of the Arguments against Copyright for DNA Are Based on a Misreading of Copyright Law
In some cases, the arguments raised against copyright protection for genetic sequences are based on a misinterpretation of copyright law. For example, Michelotti contends that "trivial" modifications of a naturally occurring genetic sequence would be uncopyrightable "derivative works," apparently based on a misunderstanding as to the meaning of the term "derivative work."
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The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as a "work based upon one or more preexisting works." 112 While not explicitly defined, the term "work" is used extensively throughout the Act to refer to works of authorship, i.e., expressive works amenable to copyright protection.
It necessarily follows that, in order for subject matter to satisfy the definition of a "derivative work," it must be based on another copyrightable work. Thus, the only way engineered DNA Moreover, the very suggestion that derivative works are uncopyrightable is itself completely wrong; true, the statute provides authors with the exclusive right to make derivative works, but the derivative works are themselves copyrightable, at least to the extent they were made with the consent of the owner of the copyright in the original work. 113 An understanding of copyright law reveals that the argument that engineered DNA is uncopyrightable because it is a derivative work is entirely baseless.
Kumar and Rai also base their conclusion that copyright is doubtful for genetic sequences in part on a misinterpretation of copyright law. For example, they assert that computer "source code may become unprotectable if it represents a method of operation," and infer that genetic sequences might likewise be treated by the courts as uncopyrightable "methods of operation."
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In support of this assertion, they point to a single reported decision, Lotus v. Borland, which they characterize as having held that the computer source code at issue in the case was a method of operation and therefore unprotectable.
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But Kumar and Rai misread the Borland decision; the case is not even one point. In
Borland the copyrightability of software code was not even a question before the court. Instead, the question was whether copyright protection extended to the computer menu command hierarchy, which is something very different from software code. 116 In fact, the defendant explicitly conceded that the plaintiff had a valid copyright in the underlying software code, and never suggested that the code itself was a method of operation. A genetic sequence, which is essentially coded information providing a set of instructions to a biological machine, is more analogous to software than a picture, graphic or sculpture. The concepts of physical and conceptual separability, while pertinent in the context of assessing the availability of copyright protection for aesthetic elements of a useful article of manufacture, such as a bicycle rack or toaster, clearly have no place in determining the availability of copyright protection for engineered genetic sequences.
VIII. The U.S. Constitution Authorizes Copyright Protection for Engineered Genetic Sequences
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution confers upon Congress the power to grant In Feist, the Supreme Court affirmed that there is a constitutional requirement of originality in copyrighted works. 132 Thus, one might envision an argument that engineered genetic sequences lack the requisite originality. However, in Feist, the Supreme Court set a very low bar for originality, requiring a mere "modicum of creativity. ingenuity and creativity of any reasonably complex engineered genetic sequences should easily satisfy the constitutional "modicum of creativity" standard.
Some commentators have expressed a concern that copyright on genetic sequences would likely impede subsequent research and innovation. This could conceivably form the basis for an argument that copyright protection for genetic sequence is unconstitutional because it violates the preambular language of the IP Clause, which arguably directs Congress to enact copyright laws that "promote progress in science and the useful arts."
134 Interestingly, the analogous argument has been raised in AMP v. USPTO, the case brought by the ACLU challenging the validity and constitutionality gene patents. 135 One of the plaintiff's constitutional arguments is based on an assertion that gene patents tend to impede rather than promote innovation, which they argue violates the preambular directive to promote science and the useful arts. policy considerations that could be advanced favoring some form of copyright protection on genetic sequences, thereby promoting the advance of science and technology.
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IX. It Is Unnecessary for the Copyright Act to Explicitly Identify Engineered Genetic Sequences as Copyrightable Subject Matter
In their 2007 article, Kumar and Rai correctly noted that "unlike software the products of synthetic biology are not discussed as copyrightable subject matter in the statute[, and thus] a court that wished to find that material copyrightable would have to do so by analogy." 141 While this statement is correct as far as it goes, in context those authors seemed to be implying that the lack of explicit reference to DNA in the copyright statute weakens the case for extending copyright to engineered DNA. In fact, however, the expansion of copyright to cover software clearly illustrates that specific mention in the copyright statute is not a prerequisite for copyright protection, and that courts routinely and justifiably rely on analogy to adapt copyright to newly arising technologies.
It is important to remember that prior to 1980 Congress, the courts and the CONTU commission all concluded that the Copyright Act encompassed software, notwithstanding the fact that the Copyright Act made absolutely no mention of computer programs until the 1980 amendment. 142 For example, the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act explicitly indicates that both houses of Congress viewed computer programs as falling within the scope of copyrightable subject matter under both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts.
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Prior to enactment of the 1976 Act, some proponents of software copyright suggested that computer programs be included in the nonexclusive list of exemplary categories of copyrightable subject matter enumerated in Section 102 of the 1976 Act. 144 However, Congress decided not to include computer programs in the list because, in its view, the Copyright Act already 140 See infra Section XIV.
141 Id.
142 See supra Section III.
143 CONTU Report, supra note 36, at 16. 144 Transcript, CONTU Meeting No. 6, p. 13.
encompassed software, so no explicit language to that effect was necessary. Both the House and Senate reports on the bill, using identical language, explained why explicit identification of software as copyrightable would be unnecessary:
[T]he history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of works accorded protection, and the subject matter affected by this expression has fallen into two general categories. In the first, scientific discoveries and technological developments have made possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before. In some of these cases the new expressive forms--electronic music, film strips, and computer programs, for example--could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from the outset without the need of new legislation. In other cases, such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory enactment was deemed necessary to give them full recognition as copyrightable works. Although the absence of specific reference to genetic sequences in the copyright statute should not render genetic sequences uncopyrightable any more than it excluded software from copyright protection prior to the 1980 amendments, Kumar and Rai are probably correct that courts will be less likely to recognize copyright protection for genetic sequences in the absence of some amendment of the Copyright Act acknowledging the copyrightability of engineered DNA. This occurred in the case of computer programs; prior to the 1980 amendments, some courts found that computer programs are not copyrightable. 150 The 1980 amendments resolved any ambiguity, and since that time the courts have consistently recognized the availability of copyright protection for software. In the same manner, amendment of the Copyright Act to explicitly mention engineered DNA would signal Congressional assent, and probably greatly facilitate acceptance of the idea by the courts.
Furthermore, Kumar and Rai are correct that analogy to other copyrighted works will be significant in extending copyright to engineered DNA. The analogy between computer software and literary works was important in the expansion of copyright to software, and the much closer analogy between engineered DNA and computer programs will greatly facilitate the incorporation of genetic sequences into the realm of copyrightable subject matter. 
X. The Development of Engineered Genetic Sequences Entails Sufficient Expressive Choice to Warrant Copyright Protection
Perhaps the most fundamental precept of copyright law is the idea/expression dichotomy, which holds that copyright protection does not extend to ideas, but is limited to the expression of ideas. 151 As a corollary, under the merger doctrine, copyright protection will be denied for the expression of an idea if there is only one, or a relatively small number of ways of expressing the idea. 152 The policy behind the merger doctrine is that if there are insufficient alternative ways of expressing an idea, then extending copyright protection to the expression would unduly restrict access to the underlying unprotectable idea.
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Some commentators have invoked the idea/expression dichotomy and merger doctrine against copyright for genetic sequences, arguing that there is insufficient expressive choice available for genetic engineers to justify copyright protection. However, this argument is based on a flawed premise; in fact, there are generally an astronomical number of alternate coding sequences that would direct essentially equivalent function in a cell, in much the same way that multiple redundant software codes can be used to direct essentially the same function in a computer.
Commentators who have raised this argument against copyright for genetic sequences have often based it on the notion that there is a single "genetic code," which they allege substantially limits expressive choice in the design of genetic sequences. For example, Kumar and Rai argue that copyright protection for genetic sequences is "less likely" because the genetic code constrains the expressive choices available to synthetic biologists, and go on to suggest that if a synthetic biologist were to use an alternate genetic code they would be more likely to incorporate sufficient expression to warrant copyright protection. 154 increasingly through the creation of new genes and other genetic elements that do not exist in nature.
In assessing whether there are sufficient alternate ways for expressing an idea to permit copyright of those expressions, the definition of the idea is critical. If the idea is expressed in very abstract terms, such as Gargano's "idea of combining promoters, plasmids, genes and bacteria," then clearly there are a virtually unlimited number of ways of expressing it. But even if the idea behind a genetic sequence is expressed very specifically, such as coding a specific amino acid sequence, it is still the case that for virtually any real protein there exists an astronomical number of redundant genetic sequences coding for it.
XI. Copyright Is Not Precluded by the Practical Utility of Genetic Sequences
Some have argued that the utilitarian nature of engineered genetic sequences renders them ineligible for copyright protection. 164 This same argument was forcefully raised with respect to software in the 1970s and early 1980s, but resoundingly rejected by the courts.
For example, some prominent members of the CONTU commission voiced their opposition to extending copyright protection to computer programs having a highly utilitarian nature. One member of the commission, Hersey, dissented from the majority's conclusion that software should be copyrightable at all, based in large part on his opinion that computer programs are too utilitarian to be eligible for copyright protection. 165 Professor Nimmer, another member of the commission, joined with the majority in recommending recognition of copyright for some computer programs, but in a concurring opinion he argued forcefully that utilitarian computer programs should not be eligible for copyright. 166 In a law review article published in have been firmly established, Professor Pamela Samuelson continued to argue forcefully that the utilitarian nature of software rendered copyright protection highly inappropriate. 167 Nonetheless, during the 1980s courts extended copyright protection to even the most utilitarian software, such as operating system programs, and since then the copyrightability of highly utilitarian software has become firmly entrenched. 168 Today, there is ample authority firmly establishing that the utilitarian nature of software is no impediment to copyrightability, and there is no reason to think that the same standard should not apply to engineered genetic sequences.
XII. Some Level of Unpredictability Does Not Preclude Copyright Protection for Engineered Genetic Sequences
Some of the arguments against copyright for genetic sequences appear to be based on a perception that genetic engineering is unpredictable, and that copyright protection is only available for predictable creative works. 169 As explained above, synthetic biologists have made huge strides in the rational design and engineering of synthetic DNA sequences encoding useful and predictable biological function. 170 But more to the point, it is well-established that copyright protection is not precluded simply because it is impossible to predict the exact nature of the creative work prior to its creation. So that while it is true that the specific functional attributes of an engineered genetic sequence is often not entirely predictable prior to its synthesis and empirical testing, this should not stand as a bar to copyright protection.
An artist creating a painting or sculpture, or photographer taking a picture, or a musician recording an improvised musical performance often cannot exactly predict the final form of the work, but that does not render the work uncopyrightable. Much highly regarded modern art is created by means of semi-random processes, and eligible for copyright protection nonetheless. 170 See supra Section V.
As noted by Prof. Nimmer, the "independent effort that constitutes originality may be inadvertent and still satisfy the requirements of copyright."
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In the realm of computer programming, software engineers (being human) lack the cognitive ability to accurately predict the performance of a complex modern computer program without actually empirically testing it, as reflected in the widespread practic you will e of beta testing, and the common occurrence of unanticipated problems with computer software products.
In principle, of course, a hypothetical engineer of unlimited cognition could predict all possible outcomes of even the most complex software, but the same might be said with respect to engineered DNA, since genes and proteins follow established rules of chemistry and physics. In practice, both must be tested empirically to confirm function and identify flaws, but this should not stand as an impediment to copyright protection.
In fact, software engineering is developing in a manner in which the final form of the computer program is less and less predictable based on the original work of the software engineer. Many computer programs now include self-modifying code that alters its own instructions while executing. 172 Evolutionary computing systems such as genetic programming are designed to permit a computer program to learn from experience and optimize a computer program's ability to perform a given computational task. 173 Meta-Genetic Programming is a proposed technique for evolving a genetic programming system using genetic programming itself. 174 The unpredictability associated with the development of these computer programs does not detract from their copyrightability, nor should it detract from the copyrightability of engineered genetic sequences.
XIII. Providing Copyright for DNA Does Not Imply That Copyright Is Generally Available for Chemical Compounds Capable of Conveying Information
It has been pointed out that DNA is far from unique in its ability to convey information.
Hormones, neurotransmitters, and transcription regulators, for example, convey biological information. Some have expressed a concern that if copyright is extended to genetic sequences there will be no principled basis for excluding other molecules capable of conveying biological information, potentially opening the floodgates to a dramatic and unwise expansion of copyrightable subject matter. While such concerns should not be dismissed out of hand, it is important to recognize that similar concerns were expressed when copyright was extended to computer programs.
For example, Professor Nimmer opined in a concurring opinion to the CONTU report that "what is most troubling about the Commission's recommendation of open-ended copyright protection for all computer software is its failure to articulate any rationale which would not equally justify copyright protection for the tangible expression of any and all original ideas (whether or not computer technology, business, or otherwise)." 175 Nimmer believed that the extension of copyright to software threatened to transform copyright into a general misappropriation law. To avoid this slippery slope, he suggested that copyright protection should be limited only to "computer programs which produce works which themselves qualify for copyright protection," i.e., word processors, graphics programs and the like. In contrast, he felt that more utilitarian software, such as computer programs "which control the heating and airconditioning in a building, or which determine the flow of fuel engine, or which control traffic signals would not be eligible for copyright because their operations do not result in copyrightable Of course, with the benefit of hindsight it is apparent that Nimmer's fear has never come to pass. The courts have extended copyright protection to highly functional software that does not itself produce copyrightable works, and this has not led to a further expansion of copyrightable subject matter, nor has copyright law been converted into a general misappropriation law. In fact, fundamental differences exist between software and other tangible expressions of ideas, thus avoiding the slippery slope problem identified by Professor Nimmer.
In the same manner, fundamental differences between engineered genetic sequences and other molecules capable of conveying information provided a principled basis for limiting copyright to DNA.
For one thing, DNA is imbued with informational characteristics that distinguish it from other molecules in ways that are both fundamental and qualitative. 184 He goes on to explain that a cell interprets the set of instructions provided in a genetic sequence by means of processes referred to as transcription and translation. 185 It is telling that the very words coined by biologists to describe these natural processes, transcription and translation, reflect the unique informational role played by DNA, and the close analogy to a written set of instructions.
The biological transcription and translation machinery present in cells, composed primarily of proteins and RNA molecules, is analogous to the components of a computer, such as the compiler, that process the instructions encoded in a computer program to cause the computer, and any associated machinery, to perform useful functions. While other molecules can convey information in a biological system, DNA is unique in that cells contain dedicated processes and molecular machinery for decoding and implementing the information coded by the genetic sequence. DNA is much more analogous to a computer program that other molecules, in that both can be expressed equivalently either as human-directed instructions printed on a piece of paper, or instructions embodied in an arrangement of matter directed towards machine (e.g, a DNA molecule or CD-ROM).
Another distinction between DNA and other molecules capable of conveying information is the complexity of the information that can be conveyed by a genetic sequence. The human body, whose structure and function is encoded by DNA, provides compelling testimony of the level of complexity possible in DNA encoded instructions. This complexity is possible because a genetic sequence can convey a long, ordered set of instructions, in the form of amino acidencoding codons, transcription regulators, genes, etc., analogous to the complex set of instructions provided by a computer program. The set of genetic instructions can be modified, recombined and expanded, in much the same way as a computer program. As is the case for computer programs, the range of expressive content inherent in DNA is limited only by the imagination.
It is significant that the Copyright Act's definition of a computer program specifies a set of instructions. 186 The fact that a computer program comprises a plurality of instructions that can be strung together in creative ways is probably essential to their copyrightability. A single instruction, like a short phrase, slogan or unit of information, would generally not be copyrightable. Similarly, a biological molecule capable of conveying a single, or limited number of instructions, should not be copyrightable. An engineered genetic sequence, on the other hand, that encodes a complex set of instructions that can be recombined in creative ways to achieve useful functions is more analogous to a computer program than other molecules capable of conveying a much more limited range of information.
Like software, a genetic sequence can be modified in predictable ways to alter the information content. The same cannot be said for most molecules. There is no generally predictable way to modify a steroid hormone to cause it to convey a different message in a living organism. As synthetic biology matures, the power and predictability with which genetic sequences will be amenable to modification, recombination and rational design will continue to expand, bringing software and engineered genetic sequences into even closer alignment.
XIV. Conclusion
The decision to treat software as a copyrightable literary work was a major conceptual leap in copyright doctrine. In this article, I have argued that further expansion to encompass engineered genetic sequences would be modest by comparison, and would appear to flow naturally from the logic supporting the initial decision to open up copyright to software.
However, the question remains whether such an expansion of copyrightable subject matter would further public policy, and if so, how could copyright best be implemented in a manner that fosters innovation and maximizes access. In 1988, Dan Burk likewise concluded that copyright doctrine could readily accommodate engineered DNA, but at the time he felt that public policy considerations weighed against doing so. But much has changed in the intervening years, and developments in synthetic biology call for a serious reconsideration of the potential policy benefits of copyright.
Copyright protection would not entirely supplant the role of patents, but in many instances might be preferable for protecting some aspects of innovation in synthetic biology. As noted by Drew Endy, patents can be prohibitively expensive to obtain and enforce, and the long delay between the filing of a patent application and issuance of a patent is inconsistent with the rapid pace of innovation in synthetic biology. Copyright is particularly suited for protecting against infringement by direct copying, which is a highly useful characteristic for technologies such as software and DNA that are extremely vulnerable to pirating due to the ease with which an unlimited number of identical copies can be produced. Criminal penalties and provisions for blocking importation of infringing materials at the border substantially augment the practical enforceability of copyrights, as do the availability of statutory damages and litigation costs for prevailing copyright owners. In many ways, the protection afforded by copyright is more limited than patent, which could be a boon to subsequent innovation. A fundamental precept of copyright law is that only the expression of an idea can be protected, not the idea itself. Thus, subsequent innovators could examine and learn from an engineered genetic sequence, and even incorporate the ideas of that sequence in their own work, so long as they do not simply copy the original innovator's choice of expression.
Copyright law has a well-developed doctrine known as fair use, which allows for certain limited uses of a copyrighted work without any liability for copyright infringement, particularly when the use is scholarly in nature, or results in some significant transformation of the original work, or does not unduly harm the economic interests of the copyright owner. In cases where fair use is not available, Congress has created a number of compulsory licensing provisions which allow for the use of copyrighted material upon the payment of some fee to the copyright owner.
There is ample precedent in copyright law for providing only limited protection to certain works. For example, copyright in sound recordings does not include the right to public performance which is afforded to the creators of most works. The copyright statute contains a number of restrictions aimed specifically at software. In the same manner, Congress could provide some limited form of copyright protection to engineered DNA in a manner that furthers public policy, without creating problems that might occur if unlimited copyright protection is provided to DNA.
